Q&A with Emil Sanamyan on Russia and Karabakh Peace Process

April 22, 2020

The interview was originally published by CivilNet.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on April 21 that the parties to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict have been presented with projects that suggest a step-by-step solution of the conflict, which “are currently actively discussed.” Lavrov added that these proposals suggest moving towards a step-by-step settlement, assuming at the first stage the solution of the most pressing problems, including the withdrawal of Armenian troops from “some territories around Nagorno Karabakh” and the unblocking of transport, economic and other communications. Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan responded immediately that “this kind of approaches had appeared in 2014 and 2016, and are not acceptable for the Armenian parties.” He stressed that for Armenia and Karabakh the paramount issues remain security and the status of Nagorno Karabakh.

Emil Sanamyan, editor of the USC Institute of Armenian Studies Focus on Karabakh platform and expert on South Caucasus elaborates the recent moves in Nagorno Karabakh negotiations with CivilNet’s Karen Harutyunyan.

– The widely discussed so-called Lavrov plan has been rejected by Armenia before and after the 2016 April war. Meanwhile, Armenia’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both have been denying a discussion of any concrete plan in negotiations. What is your view on these statements? – Foreign Minister Lavrov is the most prominent international figure to comment on the Karabakh conflict with some regularity and in the absence of much other commentary at this level, Lavrov’s words always become news. Typically, these comments are prompted by Azerbaijani or Armenian journalists during his media availabilities, and this time was not an exception as Lavrov was answering questions via an online event hosted by Gorchakov Fund.

Lavrov’s previous comments were made six months ago, when he expressed certainty that militarily the situation in Artsakh would remain stable. Those comments must have been based on assurances given by Ilham Aliyev. However, Aliyev has offered that stability as an advance to Nikol Pashinyan, hoping to convert it into serious discussion of Armenian compromises. It appears that Pashinyan has been resisting such discussions. This is the main context for Lavrov’s comments.

– Almost two years have passed since the revolution in Armenia with the new leader Nikol Pashinyan bringing new sort of discourse to the process. For example, he said that any solution to the problem must consider the interests of the peoples of Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan, while also stating that “Karabakh is Armenia, period” and that Karabakh’s participation in negotiations is a sine qua non. What kind of impact does this rhetoric have on the negotiation process and atmosphere, if any?

– I don’t think those specific comments have had any effect, as they are vague to the extreme and therefore open to interpretation. Even “Karabakh is Armenia, period” – something that was said by everyone from Leonid Azgaldyan to Serzh Sargsyan before as well – is not a statement of policy, but a very generic slogan akin to “Armenia is Europe, period.”

It is so far unclear if Pashinyan has made it a policy to make Artsakh part of the Republic of Armenia and what intermediate steps he is ready to take in that regard. Until that is clear all we have is “kicking the can down the road” approach that we had before.

– How do you see Russia’s role in the current stage of Karabakh negotiations? Why has Moscow moved to highlight the step-by-step option, knowing well that it puts the Armenian government in an “awkward position”?

– Fundamentally, this has always been the case in the Karabakh conflict and associated negotiations. If we recall the start of this conflict in 1988, the Armenian side was the one challenging the status quo and Moscow was its protector. So, compromise solutions offered by Moscow tended to fall short of the Armenian goal of Artsakh’s reunification with Armenia.

As a reminder: In 1988 Gorbachev’s offer was to raise NK’s status from autonomous oblast to autonomous republic, it was rejected. In 1991 Yeltsin’s offer was to re-establish autonomy and a similar offer was made by Yevgeni Primakov and it was again rejected in the mid-1990s. I would note that all those proposals were so-called “package proposals,” it’s just the Armenian side did not like the content of those packages.

As we know from diplomatic documents, the shift to “step-by-step” option came at the suggestion of the United States in 1997 and at the time it also had Russia’s support. The thought was that if the parties cannot agree on status, why not agree on everything else and keep the status indefinitely unresolved. As we recall, Levon Ter-Petrossian was inclined to agree to that approach and lost his job as a result. 23 years later this remains Aliyev’s preferred option for resolution, and this is occasionally reflected in comments by mediators.

But just as with “package” solutions, judgment on “step-by-step” has to be made on the basis of specific content. In general, the Armenian side is ready for steps that lead to stabilization of cease-fire and normalization of relations. That is the Armenian “step-by-step” approach. But we have yet to see a strong diplomatic effort by Armenia to promote that approach.

– Although there has not been a turn in Armenia’s foreign policy since the revolution, relations between Armenia and Russia have become uneasy in certain spheres. For example, asked about the possibility of decreasing the price of Russian gas for Armenia, Mr. Lavrov stressed that some Russian companies in Armenia are being prosecuted, and “if we talk about being allies, then, perhaps, the alliance should be displayed in all areas.” How would you assess the current state of Armenian-Russian relations? Do Armenia’s domestic developments impact these relations, and to what extent? What implications can these relations have for the Nagorno Karabakh peace negotiations, given Russia’s exclusive role in the region?

– The Russian leadership has been generally unhappy with Armenia events. At the same time, in the absence of obvious signs of change in foreign policy, Vladimir Putin has opted to take a patient approach and basically wait out Nikol Pashinyan. Considering the centralized nature of Russian leadership, personal relations with Putin remain paramount when it comes to relations between countries. The older people get, the harder it is for them to make friends, and it is hard for me to imagine any kind of friendship between Pashinyan and Putin. Armenia-Russia relations will remain in danger of deterioration, be that over Pashinyan’s treatment of Robert Kocharyan or some other issue to which Putin has shown to be sensitive.

Lack of a strong relationship between Moscow and Yerevan is of course a strategic opportunity, which Aliyev will continue to exploit. And I would note that this did not begin under Pashinyan. In fact, the “social distancing” that happened between Putin and Serzh Sargsyan was a key factor that led to the security deterioration in Karabakh and the April War.

– The calamities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic were reflected in the April 21 joint statement of the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, who stressed the importance of maintaining the ceasefire regime. Will the impending economic recession all over the world and in this region in particular impact the NK peace process in any way?

Uncertainty remains as to how long the current “stoppage” in the global economy will last and if it might be repeated later this year or next. I think it is clear that the demand for oil will remain low for the foreseeable future and Russian and other post-Soviet economies will be struggling as a result. I doubt that the NK peace process, difficult as it is, will become less difficult in these new conditions.

Armenia comes to this crisis better prepared than most other countries because of its natural geographic isolation and existing blockades, and Diaspora networks have helped it adjust to economic disruptions in the past, but Armenia will no doubt be hurting as well. It remains to be seen to what extent Armenia’s leadership will be able to handle this crisis with its challenges and opportunities.

January 11, 2021	President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan meet with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and agree to reopen transportation links. At the same time, Aliyev refuses to return an estimate 100 Armenian military personnel and civilians captured during fighting.
November 10, 2020	After Azerbaijani forces capture southern districts of Karabakh, including Hadrut and Shushi, Armenia agrees to end the fighting and withdraw from Agdam, Kelbajar and Lachin. Russian peacekeeping forces enter Karabakh.
September 27, 2020	Azerbaijan initiates a full-scale offensive along the entire line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh. After days of fighting, Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces make advances in Karabakh’s northeast and south.
July-August, 2020	Turkey pledges full support to Azerbaijan’s efforts to restore its territorial integrity. Joint military exercises take place in Azerbaijan for which Turkey transports F-16 fighter jets and other military equipment to Azerbaijan.
July 12-16, 2020	Fighting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border leaves 18 dead on both sides, including senior Azerbaijani officers. The fighting triggers pro-war protests in Azerbaijan.
February 15, 2020	Aliyev and Pashinyan meet in Munich and after the meeting hold a joint conference, which turns into a debate.
August 5, 2019	During a rally in Stepanakert, Pashinyan declares, “Artsakh is Armenia. Period.”
April-May 2018	After mass protests in Armenia, Sargsyan resigns, Nikol Pashinyan is elected as Armenia’s leader
February-October 2017	Sporadic clashes continue in Karabakh, until Sargsyan and Aliyev meet in Geneva and agree to reduce tensions
April 2-5, 2016	Azerbaijan initiates the largest offensive since the conclusion of active fighting in 1994. Azerbaijan forces capture several posts in the north and in the south of Karabakh, after an Armenian counterattack in the north, several positions are restored. In 4 days of fighting, heavy artillery and drones are involved, with some 200 people killed on both sides.
March 31-April 1, 2016	US Secretary of State John Kerry holds separate meetings with Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Washington. Hours later Azerbaijan begins an offensive in Karabakh.
2012-2016	Low-intensity fighting takes place in Karabakh and on Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with Azerbaijani forces conducting hit-and-run attacks, and Armenian forces retaliating.
June 2011	During talks in Kazan, Russia Aliyev walks away from an agreement with Sargsyan on basic principles of resolution.
November 2, 2008	The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, meet in Moscow and pledge to find a political solution to the Karabakh conflict, but no progress is made in talks.
November 29, 2007	After a meeting in Madrid the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs announce that a set of Basic Principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict is proposed. The principles link Armenian withdrawals from the east and south of Karabakh to security guarantees and determination of Karabakh’s status via referendum.
February 19, 2004	During NATO training in Budapest, Azerbaijani officer Ramil Safarov murders Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe in his sleep, triggering international condemnation and deepening of mistrust between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies.
August-December, 2003	Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev dies, succeeded by his son Ilham Aliyev.
April 2001	Armenia’s Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev come close to an agreement that would make NKAO and Lachin corridor part of Armenia, with other territories transferred to Azerbaijan; Aliyev backs away from the agreement.
February 3, 1998	Armenia’s first president Levon Ter-Petrossian resigns after his plan for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict is rejected. Former Karabakh leader Robert Kocharyan is elected president of Armenia.
January 1, 1997	The OSCE Minsk Groups establishes the trilateral co-chairmanship format of the United States, France, and Russia, still in effect until today.
December 2, 1996	During the OSCE summit in Lisbon, Azerbaijan stresses the importance of territorial integrity; Armenia vetoes the final document.
March 23, 1995	OSCE established the co-chairmanship of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group.
May 12, 1994	Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh agree on a cease-fire brokered by Russia, ending three years of fighting.
April-May, 1994	Armenian forces advance in Agdam and Mardakert districts.
December 1993-February 1994	Azerbaijani forces on the offensive in Karabakh, but their efforts to make advances are repulsed by Armenian forces.
November 12, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 884 condemns the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Horadiz, attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic; calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic.
October 14, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 874 expresses concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region and supports the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE.
August 23-31, 1993	Armenian forces establish control over Jebrayil, Kubatli districts and part of Fizuli, to the south of NKAO’s administrative border.
July 29, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 853 expresses concern over the seizure of the district of Agdam in the Azerbaijani Republic (not specified by whom), Urges the Government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region to comply with the resolutions.
April 30, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 822 expresses serious concern at the deterioration of the relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbajar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces.
November 1992-February, 1993	Armenian forces retake the initiative in the war, expanding the Lachin corridor, creating a security buffer around Kapan and recapturing much of the Mardakert district
June-October, 1992	Azerbaijani forces on the offensive against Karabakh, with almost half of the Armenian territory, including Shaumyan and Mardakert districts, captured, and local population displaced.
May 18, 1992	Armenian forces take control of Lachin, establishing a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.
May 9, 1992	Armenians take Shushi, effectively ending the siege and bombardment of Stepanakert from the GRAD launchers located in Shushi.
April 10, 1992	Azerbaijani forces enter the village of Maragha, murdering some forty civilians.
May 18, 1992	Armenian forces take control of Lachin, establishing a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.
May 9, 1992	Armenians take Shushi, lifting the siege of Stepanakert.
April 10, 1992	Azerbaijani forces enter the village of Maragha, in NKAO’s northeast, murdering some forty civilians.
February 26, 1992	Armenian self-defense forces capture the Khojaly settlement, where Karabakh’s only airport is located; hundreds of civilians die as they flee from Khojaly towards Agdam
September 25, 1991	The siege of Stepanakert begins with shelling launched from Shushi and nearby villages. Armenian self-defense forces are surrounded in NKAO, resupplied from Armenia by helicopters.
September 21, 1991	Armenia declares independence after the positive results of the nationwide referendum.
September 2, 1991	Nagorno Karabakh declares itself a republic, citing Soviet law on secession and international principle of self-determination
August 30, 1991	Azerbaijan declares itself independent of the Soviet Union and a successor state of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (1918-20)
January 1990-August, 1991	Supported by Soviet internal troops, Azerbaijani security forces conduct operations intended to expel the Armenian population from the vicinity and inside NKAO. Armenian self-defense is organized.
January 13-19, 1990	Pogroms of the Armenian population in Baku lead to dozens killed, and remaining Armenians leaving Azerbaijan.
December 1, 1989	Legislatures of Soviet Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast make declarations of unification.
Fall 1988	Massive exodus of the Armenian population from Armenia and Azerbaijani population from Armenia; dozens killed in ethnic-motivated clashes.
July 18, 1988	The Supreme Council of the USSR rejects Armenian demands of unification.
June 17, 1988	Soviet Azerbaijan expresses opposition to calls of transferring Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Soviet Armenia.
June 15, 1988	Soviet Armenian legislature votes in favor of unifying with Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.
June 12, 1988	Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast regional legislature votes in favor of unification with Soviet Armenia.
March 25, 1988	Soviet leader Gorbachev rejects Armenian calls of unification.
February 27-29, 1988	Pogroms in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait lead to the deaths of dozens of Armenians at the hands of Azerbaijani mob and the exodus of the large Armenian community of Azerbaijan.
February 22, 1988	Azerbaijanis march from the town of Aghdam towards Karabakh, where they meet an Armenian counter-protest, first deadly clashes ensue in the town of Askeran.
February 20, 1988	After public protests and grassroots lobbying, NKAO legislature adopts an appeal to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moscow to consider reassigning the oblast to Soviet Armenia.
July 7, 1923	Soviet Azerbaijan establishes borders of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (region), making it an enclave surrounded by Azerbaijani territory. Throughout the Soviet period Armenians raised the issue of reassigning Karabakh to Armenia, but Moscow rebuffed these efforts citing opposition from Azerbaijan.
July 5, 1921	After first Azerbaijan and then Armenia were both occupied by the Red Army, the dispute over Karabakh persisted. The Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Bolsheviks decided to establish a Karabakh autonomy inside Soviet Azerbaijan.
May 28, 1918	Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent following the Russian Revolution, and almost immediately went to war over several disputed territories, including Karabakh. By the fall of 1918, Turkish forces occupied much of the Caucasus, including Karabakh’s capital of Shusha. Turkish-Azerbaijani forces tried to control Karabakh but met Armenian resistance.

1.	At about 7AM on Sunday morning, Turkish and Azerbaijani forces launched an unprecedented attack on the Armenian-administered Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh), with hundreds of missiles and drones launched, followed by ground attacks. Turkish forces included an F-16 squadron that specializes in air defense suppression, the Bayraktar drone fleet that targets ground forces, and more than 2,000 mercenary forces, most of them from Syria, used to launch ground attacks.
2.	The attack came after open threats of military action against Armenia made by Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his defense minister Hulusi Akar. According to reporting by the Russian Kommersant newspaper, Akar along with other senior Turkish military officers were in Azerbaijan and directly in charge of the offensive.
3.	As the attack unfolded, Turkish leaders said that their goal was to completely oust Armenian forces from Artsakh and Turkish military and associated social media began publishing videos from Turkish Bayraktar drones showing attacks against Armenian forces, as well as claims of tactical advances.
4.	In early October, Azerbaijan’s artillery and air attacks increasingly became indiscriminate, focusing the shelling on population centers such as Stepanakert, rather than military targets. The Armenian side responded with attacks against Azerbaijani towns such as Ganja, Mingechaur and Barda.
5.	In fighting on the ground, Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces succeeded in capturing the two Armenian-populated villages of Talish and Madagis in Artsakh’s northeast, and advanced in the south of Karabakh, along the border with Iran and through Hadrut towards Shushi. As fighting continued Azerbaijan was resupplied with ammunition from Israel, Ukraine and Belarus, and mercenaries from Turkey.
6.	In the more than 40 days of fighting, Russia, France and the United States – the three co-chairs in the international mediation effort on Karabakh – have failed to put an end to fighting or even to limit weapons and mercenary transfers that are fueling the war or introduce any other sanctions.
7.	By the time the cease-fire was agreed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on November 10, 2020, more than 3,500 Armenians, more than 3,000 Azerbaijanis and more than 500 Syrian mercenaries were confirmed killed. More than 100,000 people were displaced.
8.	In line with the cease-fire terms, Armenian forces withdrew from Aghdam, Kelbajar and Lachin district, while Russian forces deployed along the perimeter of the part of Karabakh that remained under Armenian control and along a 5km Lachin corridor connection to the Republic of Armenia. In all some three-fourth of pre-war Armenian-controlled territory is now controlled by Turkish-backed Azerbaijan.
9.	In violation of the cease-fire terms, in November-December 2020 Azerbaijani forces continued to advance in parts of Karabakh, capturing two more Armenian settlements and more than 70 Armenian military personnel and civilians, most of whom, along with others captured before the cease-fire, remain in Azerbaijan custody.
10.	The Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh is agreed for five years, with no determination of Karabakh’s status or security guarantees. Still more than 50,000 Karabakh Armenians displaced during the fighting have returned to Karabakh, primarily Stepanakert, since the cease-fire.

1.	Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) is a place of great natural beauty and peopled by indigenous Armenians best known for their humility and subtle sense of humor. Among people with roots in Artsakh are the world chess champion Garry Kasparov, Soviet composer Mikael Tariverdiyev and military figure Hovanes Bagramyan.
2.	The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno Karabakh is more than 100 years old and it pre-dates the establishment of independent national republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1918.
3.	Creation of the Armenian autonomy of Karabakh within Soviet Azerbaijan (1921-91) both helped freeze and preserve the conflict over the territory that reignited with the Soviet Union’s unraveling.
4.	The war over Karabakh of 1991-94, began as an ethnic cleansing campaign against Karabakh Armenians and as Armenians resisted, hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes on both sides of the conflict. Since 1990, there are no more Armenian communities on Azerbaijani-controlled side of the conflict and no Azerbaijani communities on the Armenian side.
5.	Azerbaijan – ruled by the Aliyev family for almost half a century – demands complete control over Nagorno Karabakh, which amounts to a call for its total ethnic cleansing. For decades, Azerbaijan has prohibited entry to ethnic Armenians (or people with Armenian-sounding names), independent of their citizenship. Azerbaijan has also charged its citizens who visited Armenia with treason. Any peace-building efforts were discouraged.
6.	The Second Karabakh war in the Fall of 2020 was jointly launched by Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Aliyev. Turkish air force and mercenary forces from Syria helped displace more than 30,000 Armenians, Artsakh’s civilians and infrastructure were attacked, with dozens of civilians killed, hundreds injured and tens of thousands displaced.
7.	In just 44 days of active combat, more than 3,500 Armenians, more than 3,000 Azerbaijanis and more than 500 Turkish Syrian mercenaries were killed.
8.	There are documented reports of war crimes being committed by Azerbaijani forces and Turkish mercenaries, including execution of prisoners, both civilian and military, beheadings and other degrading treatment.
9.	As a result of the November 10 cease-fire agreed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, Russian forces have been introduced and now protect the Armenian-populated parts of Karabakh and a narrow corridor from Karabakh to Armenia. A joint Russian-Turkish “monitoring center” is expected to be set up in an area adjacent to the Russian-controlled area.
10.	The agreement in force has not meant an end to the conflict. In particular, in violation of the agreement Azerbaijani forces continued to move their positions forward to capture more territory as well as prisoners of war and civilian hostages. Currently about 100 Armenians captured in Karabakh, most since after the cease-fire, are detained in Azerbaijan. Aliyev has refused to release them.

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