CALL FOR PAPERS – “Armenian Diaspora(s) in Motion : Places, Stakeholders and Practices in the 21st Century”

May 15, 2023

Since diaspora studies emerged in the 1980s, the Armenian dispersion has played a prominent role in the scholarly literature seeking to understand and classify the nature, forms, and effects of diasporas as social formations.

Although the notion of diaspora is multifaceted – changing based on the cases observed, criteria retained, disciplinary fields, and its dissemination and use by various actors (Hovanessian, 1998; Brubaker, 2005; Dufoix, 2011) – the Armenian experience, along with the Greek and Jewish cases, is widely discussed in works attempting to establish typologies of uprooted communities (Cohen, 1997; Bruneau, 1995, 2022; Sheffer, 2003; Tölölyan, 1996) as well as in the efforts to compare the diasporas considered paradigmatic (Bruneau et al., 2007; Hovannisian and Myers, 1999).

Among the criteria associated with the Armenian case, the longevity of the dispersion (Bruneau, 2007; Tölölyan, 2005; Panossian, 2006), a shared collective memory (Safran, 1991), and the vitality of an active minority that relies on old and conservative institutions (Ter Minassian, 1997; Tölölyan, 2000) are often cited. They help maintain transnational networks and nurture an “imagined community”, as well as a wished-for cohesion, especially in moments of converging mobilizations (Tölölyan, 1996).

However, 40 years after the rise of diaspora studies, one has to admit that far from offering a stable paradigm, the Armenian diaspora (an expression that should be used in the plural) has undergone numerous transformations. This is partly due to the ebb and flow of geopolitics, new technological developments, and socio-economic changes in the historical centers of the Armenian presence

With the end of the Soviet Union, new types of migration surfaced. Emigration from the Republic of Armenia – often perceived, justly or unjustly, as a “bleeding wound” – has profoundly changed the face of the diaspora. What is more, the last three decades have seen intensified processes of permanent or temporary “return” migration, reshaping the diaspora, Armenia, the ties between them, and leading to new modes of life in-between.

By the same token, new communities have sprung up in places that were not traditional Armenian settlements. Conversely, regions that had been home to genocide refugees and their descendants, and that had grown into full-blown epicenters of the “Armenian transnation”, have gradually or abruptly been emptied of their Armenian population in the wake of political crises, wars and economic instability (Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Syria). Such recent developments call for a reassessment of the notions of homeland(s), home(s) and belonging(s) (Kasbarian, 2015 and 2020; Darieva, 2011; Panossian, 2014).

Similarly, territories with a long-standing Armenian presence, dating back to the 1920s (France, Belgium) or even the end of the 19th century (United States), have witnessed the arrival of new cohorts of Armenian immigrants hailing from new regions (Armenia, the Caucasus, and Russia after the end of the USSR, Syria after 2011), with heterogeneous socio-economic profiles. The settlement of these newly-arrived co-ethnics has paved the way for an ethno-cultural “replenishment” (Jimenez, 2010), revitalizing traditional community structures (schools, media, religious and political organizations, etc.). However, it has also given rise to new problems and questions at the individual and institutional levels, reshaping existing diasporic dynamics and leading to intra-group conflict, competition, mutual ignorance, or defiance, as noted by observers and stakeholders of the Armenian diaspora (Mekdjian, 2008; Cavoukian, 2021; Der Sarkissian, 2021).

While new diasporic communities are emerging, the historical loci of Armenian presence have lost their institutional resources and experienced new forms of member dispersal, fueling a declinist discourse centered on the haunting theme of “identity dilution” (Hovanessian, 2007). Simultaneously, voices that had previously been absent, ignored or imperceptible are gaining momentum, renewing the agenda of “ethno-political entrepreneurs” (Brubaker, 2004), and reinventing the repertoire of diasporic mobilization, which can take the form of aid and support for the disputed region of Karabagh, and can sometimes challenge or undermine traditional community structures, actors, and practices.

The objective of this 2-day conference will be to reflect on these contemporary reshapings of the Armenian diaspora(s), revealing their diversity and the new dynamics at work.

Proposals for papers may address the following issues, without necessarily being limited to them:

● How have succeeding migration histories and the heterogeneity of cohorts transformed diasporic spaces and Armenian communities?

● How have the various actors/stakeholders of the “old” diasporas responded to the demographic, political, and socio-cultural issues arising from the new context? What new actors have emerged?

● What impact have different kinds of “return” migrations had, whether they involve settling in the (“step-”)homeland, making pilgrimages to historical Armenia, or volunteering for international or local NGOs, thereby combining tourism with assistance to the country and self-discovery? How can the notion of homeland be reframed by the co-presence of a real homeland, and an imaginary or surrogate homeland?

● What new diasporic loci have emerged in the Armenian world? What roles do they play in this new set of dynamics?

● How does language reflect the ongoing changes occurring within Armenian diasporas?

● What roles do the media and social networks play on these transformations?

● How can we map out the contemporary Armenian dispersion, as well as the spaces, dynamics, practices, actors, and discourses that compose it? Which fields should be further explored to refine our understanding of the vast diasporic web? Which actors are interested in unpacking it, why, and what tools and resources do they use?

● What lessons can be drawn from other case studies? Beyond the classical comparisons between “textbook diasporas”, what other examples can be explored to better grasp and gauge what is currently at stake?

Colloquium Information

Dates: March 14 and 15, 2024

Location(s) : Conference Center, Campus Condorcet, Paris-Aubervilliers. 8, cours des Humanités 93322 Aubervilliers (metro station : line 12 – Front Populaire).

Submission guidelines: papers may be presented either in English or French. Abstracts (500 words) along with a short biographical notice must be sent to diasporas.in.motion@gmail.com by June 30, 2023.

Notification of selection from the scientific committee: July 2023

Travel expenses : participants’ travel and hotel expenses can be covered by the conference organizers.

Publication: the conference will be followed by a peer-reviewed publication in Études arméniennes contemporaines. The selected participants are expected to turn in a first draft of their article by March 1st, 2024.

Organizing committee:

Boris Adjemian

AGBU Nubar library, CRH-EHESS, Institut Convergences Migrations

Anouche Der Sarkissian

Sorbonne Nouvelle, CREW, Institut Convergences Migrations

Alain Navarra de Borgia-Navassartian

University of Bologna

Yann Scioldo-Zürcher

CNRS, CRH-EHESS, Institut Convergences Migrations

January 11, 2021	President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan meet with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and agree to reopen transportation links. At the same time, Aliyev refuses to return an estimate 100 Armenian military personnel and civilians captured during fighting.
November 10, 2020	After Azerbaijani forces capture southern districts of Karabakh, including Hadrut and Shushi, Armenia agrees to end the fighting and withdraw from Agdam, Kelbajar and Lachin. Russian peacekeeping forces enter Karabakh.
September 27, 2020	Azerbaijan initiates a full-scale offensive along the entire line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh. After days of fighting, Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces make advances in Karabakh’s northeast and south.
July-August, 2020	Turkey pledges full support to Azerbaijan’s efforts to restore its territorial integrity. Joint military exercises take place in Azerbaijan for which Turkey transports F-16 fighter jets and other military equipment to Azerbaijan.
July 12-16, 2020	Fighting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border leaves 18 dead on both sides, including senior Azerbaijani officers. The fighting triggers pro-war protests in Azerbaijan.
February 15, 2020	Aliyev and Pashinyan meet in Munich and after the meeting hold a joint conference, which turns into a debate.
August 5, 2019	During a rally in Stepanakert, Pashinyan declares, “Artsakh is Armenia. Period.”
April-May 2018	After mass protests in Armenia, Sargsyan resigns, Nikol Pashinyan is elected as Armenia’s leader
February-October 2017	Sporadic clashes continue in Karabakh, until Sargsyan and Aliyev meet in Geneva and agree to reduce tensions
April 2-5, 2016	Azerbaijan initiates the largest offensive since the conclusion of active fighting in 1994. Azerbaijan forces capture several posts in the north and in the south of Karabakh, after an Armenian counterattack in the north, several positions are restored. In 4 days of fighting, heavy artillery and drones are involved, with some 200 people killed on both sides.
March 31-April 1, 2016	US Secretary of State John Kerry holds separate meetings with Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Washington. Hours later Azerbaijan begins an offensive in Karabakh.
2012-2016	Low-intensity fighting takes place in Karabakh and on Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with Azerbaijani forces conducting hit-and-run attacks, and Armenian forces retaliating.
June 2011	During talks in Kazan, Russia Aliyev walks away from an agreement with Sargsyan on basic principles of resolution.
November 2, 2008	The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, meet in Moscow and pledge to find a political solution to the Karabakh conflict, but no progress is made in talks.
November 29, 2007	After a meeting in Madrid the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs announce that a set of Basic Principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict is proposed. The principles link Armenian withdrawals from the east and south of Karabakh to security guarantees and determination of Karabakh’s status via referendum.
February 19, 2004	During NATO training in Budapest, Azerbaijani officer Ramil Safarov murders Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe in his sleep, triggering international condemnation and deepening of mistrust between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies.
August-December, 2003	Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev dies, succeeded by his son Ilham Aliyev.
April 2001	Armenia’s Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev come close to an agreement that would make NKAO and Lachin corridor part of Armenia, with other territories transferred to Azerbaijan; Aliyev backs away from the agreement.
February 3, 1998	Armenia’s first president Levon Ter-Petrossian resigns after his plan for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict is rejected. Former Karabakh leader Robert Kocharyan is elected president of Armenia.
January 1, 1997	The OSCE Minsk Groups establishes the trilateral co-chairmanship format of the United States, France, and Russia, still in effect until today.
December 2, 1996	During the OSCE summit in Lisbon, Azerbaijan stresses the importance of territorial integrity; Armenia vetoes the final document.
March 23, 1995	OSCE established the co-chairmanship of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group.
May 12, 1994	Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh agree on a cease-fire brokered by Russia, ending three years of fighting.
April-May, 1994	Armenian forces advance in Agdam and Mardakert districts.
December 1993-February 1994	Azerbaijani forces on the offensive in Karabakh, but their efforts to make advances are repulsed by Armenian forces.
November 12, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 884 condemns the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Horadiz, attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic; calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic.
October 14, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 874 expresses concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region and supports the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE.
August 23-31, 1993	Armenian forces establish control over Jebrayil, Kubatli districts and part of Fizuli, to the south of NKAO’s administrative border.
July 29, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 853 expresses concern over the seizure of the district of Agdam in the Azerbaijani Republic (not specified by whom), Urges the Government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region to comply with the resolutions.
April 30, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 822 expresses serious concern at the deterioration of the relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbajar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces.
November 1992-February, 1993	Armenian forces retake the initiative in the war, expanding the Lachin corridor, creating a security buffer around Kapan and recapturing much of the Mardakert district
June-October, 1992	Azerbaijani forces on the offensive against Karabakh, with almost half of the Armenian territory, including Shaumyan and Mardakert districts, captured, and local population displaced.
May 18, 1992	Armenian forces take control of Lachin, establishing a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.
May 9, 1992	Armenians take Shushi, effectively ending the siege and bombardment of Stepanakert from the GRAD launchers located in Shushi.
April 10, 1992	Azerbaijani forces enter the village of Maragha, murdering some forty civilians.
May 18, 1992	Armenian forces take control of Lachin, establishing a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.
May 9, 1992	Armenians take Shushi, lifting the siege of Stepanakert.
April 10, 1992	Azerbaijani forces enter the village of Maragha, in NKAO’s northeast, murdering some forty civilians.
February 26, 1992	Armenian self-defense forces capture the Khojaly settlement, where Karabakh’s only airport is located; hundreds of civilians die as they flee from Khojaly towards Agdam
September 25, 1991	The siege of Stepanakert begins with shelling launched from Shushi and nearby villages. Armenian self-defense forces are surrounded in NKAO, resupplied from Armenia by helicopters.
September 21, 1991	Armenia declares independence after the positive results of the nationwide referendum.
September 2, 1991	Nagorno Karabakh declares itself a republic, citing Soviet law on secession and international principle of self-determination
August 30, 1991	Azerbaijan declares itself independent of the Soviet Union and a successor state of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (1918-20)
January 1990-August, 1991	Supported by Soviet internal troops, Azerbaijani security forces conduct operations intended to expel the Armenian population from the vicinity and inside NKAO. Armenian self-defense is organized.
January 13-19, 1990	Pogroms of the Armenian population in Baku lead to dozens killed, and remaining Armenians leaving Azerbaijan.
December 1, 1989	Legislatures of Soviet Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast make declarations of unification.
Fall 1988	Massive exodus of the Armenian population from Armenia and Azerbaijani population from Armenia; dozens killed in ethnic-motivated clashes.
July 18, 1988	The Supreme Council of the USSR rejects Armenian demands of unification.
June 17, 1988	Soviet Azerbaijan expresses opposition to calls of transferring Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Soviet Armenia.
June 15, 1988	Soviet Armenian legislature votes in favor of unifying with Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.
June 12, 1988	Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast regional legislature votes in favor of unification with Soviet Armenia.
March 25, 1988	Soviet leader Gorbachev rejects Armenian calls of unification.
February 27-29, 1988	Pogroms in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait lead to the deaths of dozens of Armenians at the hands of Azerbaijani mob and the exodus of the large Armenian community of Azerbaijan.
February 22, 1988	Azerbaijanis march from the town of Aghdam towards Karabakh, where they meet an Armenian counter-protest, first deadly clashes ensue in the town of Askeran.
February 20, 1988	After public protests and grassroots lobbying, NKAO legislature adopts an appeal to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moscow to consider reassigning the oblast to Soviet Armenia.
July 7, 1923	Soviet Azerbaijan establishes borders of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (region), making it an enclave surrounded by Azerbaijani territory. Throughout the Soviet period Armenians raised the issue of reassigning Karabakh to Armenia, but Moscow rebuffed these efforts citing opposition from Azerbaijan.
July 5, 1921	After first Azerbaijan and then Armenia were both occupied by the Red Army, the dispute over Karabakh persisted. The Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Bolsheviks decided to establish a Karabakh autonomy inside Soviet Azerbaijan.
May 28, 1918	Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent following the Russian Revolution, and almost immediately went to war over several disputed territories, including Karabakh. By the fall of 1918, Turkish forces occupied much of the Caucasus, including Karabakh’s capital of Shusha. Turkish-Azerbaijani forces tried to control Karabakh but met Armenian resistance.

1.	At about 7AM on Sunday morning, Turkish and Azerbaijani forces launched an unprecedented attack on the Armenian-administered Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh), with hundreds of missiles and drones launched, followed by ground attacks. Turkish forces included an F-16 squadron that specializes in air defense suppression, the Bayraktar drone fleet that targets ground forces, and more than 2,000 mercenary forces, most of them from Syria, used to launch ground attacks.
2.	The attack came after open threats of military action against Armenia made by Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his defense minister Hulusi Akar. According to reporting by the Russian Kommersant newspaper, Akar along with other senior Turkish military officers were in Azerbaijan and directly in charge of the offensive.
3.	As the attack unfolded, Turkish leaders said that their goal was to completely oust Armenian forces from Artsakh and Turkish military and associated social media began publishing videos from Turkish Bayraktar drones showing attacks against Armenian forces, as well as claims of tactical advances.
4.	In early October, Azerbaijan’s artillery and air attacks increasingly became indiscriminate, focusing the shelling on population centers such as Stepanakert, rather than military targets. The Armenian side responded with attacks against Azerbaijani towns such as Ganja, Mingechaur and Barda.
5.	In fighting on the ground, Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces succeeded in capturing the two Armenian-populated villages of Talish and Madagis in Artsakh’s northeast, and advanced in the south of Karabakh, along the border with Iran and through Hadrut towards Shushi. As fighting continued Azerbaijan was resupplied with ammunition from Israel, Ukraine and Belarus, and mercenaries from Turkey.
6.	In the more than 40 days of fighting, Russia, France and the United States – the three co-chairs in the international mediation effort on Karabakh – have failed to put an end to fighting or even to limit weapons and mercenary transfers that are fueling the war or introduce any other sanctions.
7.	By the time the cease-fire was agreed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on November 10, 2020, more than 3,500 Armenians, more than 3,000 Azerbaijanis and more than 500 Syrian mercenaries were confirmed killed. More than 100,000 people were displaced.
8.	In line with the cease-fire terms, Armenian forces withdrew from Aghdam, Kelbajar and Lachin district, while Russian forces deployed along the perimeter of the part of Karabakh that remained under Armenian control and along a 5km Lachin corridor connection to the Republic of Armenia. In all some three-fourth of pre-war Armenian-controlled territory is now controlled by Turkish-backed Azerbaijan.
9.	In violation of the cease-fire terms, in November-December 2020 Azerbaijani forces continued to advance in parts of Karabakh, capturing two more Armenian settlements and more than 70 Armenian military personnel and civilians, most of whom, along with others captured before the cease-fire, remain in Azerbaijan custody.
10.	The Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh is agreed for five years, with no determination of Karabakh’s status or security guarantees. Still more than 50,000 Karabakh Armenians displaced during the fighting have returned to Karabakh, primarily Stepanakert, since the cease-fire.

1.	Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) is a place of great natural beauty and peopled by indigenous Armenians best known for their humility and subtle sense of humor. Among people with roots in Artsakh are the world chess champion Garry Kasparov, Soviet composer Mikael Tariverdiyev and military figure Hovanes Bagramyan.
2.	The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno Karabakh is more than 100 years old and it pre-dates the establishment of independent national republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1918.
3.	Creation of the Armenian autonomy of Karabakh within Soviet Azerbaijan (1921-91) both helped freeze and preserve the conflict over the territory that reignited with the Soviet Union’s unraveling.
4.	The war over Karabakh of 1991-94, began as an ethnic cleansing campaign against Karabakh Armenians and as Armenians resisted, hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes on both sides of the conflict. Since 1990, there are no more Armenian communities on Azerbaijani-controlled side of the conflict and no Azerbaijani communities on the Armenian side.
5.	Azerbaijan – ruled by the Aliyev family for almost half a century – demands complete control over Nagorno Karabakh, which amounts to a call for its total ethnic cleansing. For decades, Azerbaijan has prohibited entry to ethnic Armenians (or people with Armenian-sounding names), independent of their citizenship. Azerbaijan has also charged its citizens who visited Armenia with treason. Any peace-building efforts were discouraged.
6.	The Second Karabakh war in the Fall of 2020 was jointly launched by Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Aliyev. Turkish air force and mercenary forces from Syria helped displace more than 30,000 Armenians, Artsakh’s civilians and infrastructure were attacked, with dozens of civilians killed, hundreds injured and tens of thousands displaced.
7.	In just 44 days of active combat, more than 3,500 Armenians, more than 3,000 Azerbaijanis and more than 500 Turkish Syrian mercenaries were killed.
8.	There are documented reports of war crimes being committed by Azerbaijani forces and Turkish mercenaries, including execution of prisoners, both civilian and military, beheadings and other degrading treatment.
9.	As a result of the November 10 cease-fire agreed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, Russian forces have been introduced and now protect the Armenian-populated parts of Karabakh and a narrow corridor from Karabakh to Armenia. A joint Russian-Turkish “monitoring center” is expected to be set up in an area adjacent to the Russian-controlled area.
10.	The agreement in force has not meant an end to the conflict. In particular, in violation of the agreement Azerbaijani forces continued to move their positions forward to capture more territory as well as prisoners of war and civilian hostages. Currently about 100 Armenians captured in Karabakh, most since after the cease-fire, are detained in Azerbaijan. Aliyev has refused to release them.

The Institute

Follow Us

What We’re Reading

Recent Posts

CALL FOR PAPERS – “Armenian Diaspora(s) in Motion : Places, Stakeholders and Practices in the 21st Century”

Search

Focus on Karabakh

What We’re Reading

Explore Podcasts

Categories

The Institute

Useful Links

Follow Us

Interviewer

Interviewee

Interview Details

Select Interview Topics