Akram Aylisli's "Stone Dreams" Released in English Translation

Akram Aylisli’s “Stone Dreams” Released in English Translation

November 26, 2018

A short novel that shook the Azerbaijani political establishment, when it was published in Russian translation five years ago, is finally out in English. Akram Aylisli’s “Stone Dreams” have been translated by Katherine E. Young and is available via Amazon. Armenian and Italian translations had appeared before.

The author had been condemned in Azerbaijan because the novel is set during the period of anti-Armenian violence in Aylis (Agulis) in Nakhichevan in 1919 and during anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku in 1990. Aylisli said he decided to publish his book after the Azerbaijani government secured the release of axe murderer Ramil Seferov. According to Aylisli, the publication achieved its main goal: “I saved many Armenians from hating my people.”

Now 80 years old, Aylisli like many other Azerbaijani dissidents, is prohibited from traveling out of the country. He said in a recent interviewthat he “live(s) completely isolated from society. Completely. It’s as if I’m in exile.”

The book was widely welcomed in Armenia. Below is a review of those reactions, mostly from 2013 and 2014, published by the Caucasus Survey journal, Vol. 2, numbers 1-2, pp. 60-63.

Acknowledgement and praise: Armenian reactions to Akram Aylisli’s novel Stone Dreams
EMIL SANAMYAN
Virgina Tech University;

Predictably, reactions to Akram Aylisli’s novel Stone Dreams were mostly positive both in Armenia and among Armenians in the diaspora. Yet as was the case with many of the novel’s opponents, many of Aylisli’s Armenian sympathizers had not actually read Stone Dreams. They were nevertheless impressed that an Azerbaijani writer, particularly one of some standing with the Aliyev regime, a former member of parliament and holder of various awards and medals, would take such personal risks in “defence of Armenians.”

The context in which Aylisli’s book appeared is of course what makes this work so remarkable. The list of mutual Armenian-Azerbaijani grievances has continued to grow since the Karabakh war ended more than 20 years ago without a final peace agreement. In addition to the dozens still being killed on the Line of Contact every year, threats of new war and hateful, disrespectful rhetoric and actions on both sides continue to feed the propaganda war. Those on the Armenian side have been particularly aggrieved by the destruction of remaining Armenian cemeteries and other cultural landmarks, including in Baku and in Aylisli’s native Nakhichevan1; the many billions the Aliyev regime has been spending on weapons, driving Armenia into greater dependence on Russia and raising the cost of potential war for both sides; the crackdown on public-level Armenian-Azerbaijani contacts intended to build mutual trust; and perhaps most significantly the official praise of the axe murderer Ramil Safarov freed and promoted by the Azerbaijani government.

Aylisli himself has pointed to the Safarov scandal as an important motivation for him to publish the novel that he had written five years earlier. “I thought I wouldn’t have it published for a while,” Aylisli told journalist Shura Burtin last year (Burtin 2013). “But then I said I have to. Whatever it takes, I must stand against what’s going on.” Aylisli also acknowledged that had it not been for the Azerbaijani government’s harassment, the publication of the novel would probably have passed by unnoticed.

Within weeks of Aylisli’s work garnering publicity, Stone Dreams was translated into Armenian, so far the only known translation other than the Russian one. The Azerbaijani original has not yet been published and a Turkish translation may appear before that eventuality. Publisher Ruben Hovsepyan admitted that he decided to publish the novel even before he had read it, because of its public resonance (epress.am 2013a). Translator Leonid Zilfugaryan praise the work for its “spirit of honesty” and said he stayed close to the original without taking translating liberties. Both Hovsepyan and Zilfugarian are accomplished writers and translators, with their translating credits including Tolstoy, Chekhov and Marquez, and Saroyan and Dovlatov, respectively. Hovsepyan also admitted that the translation was made without Aylisli’s permission, whom they were unable to reach, but added that he was ready to offer compensation if Aylisli demands it. Aylisli confirmed that he was not asked for permission, and that if he had
been asked he would not have agreed. But Aylisli also decided not to protest the translation after the fact, even though he did not know either Hovsepyan or Zilfugaryan. “The only Armenian writers I have known [closely] are Hrant Matevosyan and his translator Anahit Bayandur, who studied with me in Moscow, both of them have passed away,” Aylisli added (Radio Azadlig 2013a).

The Armenian reactions to Aylisli’s novel can be broadly grouped into two categories: propagandistic and genuinely sympathetic. Propagandistic reactions tended to focus not so much on Aylisli or his work, but on the official campaign against him, which served to confirm for their authors yet again the nature of President Ilham Aliyev’s regime in Azerbaijan. For example, Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan complained that, “[h]igher officials of Azerbaijan propagate intolerance, hatred, war and proclaim racist murderers as heroes. And what about supporters of peace and solidarity, [such as] Akram Ailisli…? They threaten to cut off his ear” (Armenpress 2013).

Actions and threats against Aylisli were also cited in press releases of the Armenian American lobby. A statement by Congressman Adam Schiff, who represents the largest Armenian constituency in southern California, found that “[w]ith these disgusting acts, the Azeri state reminded the whole world why the people of Artsakh (Karabakh) must be allowed to determine their own future and cannot be allowed to slip into Aliyev’s clutches, lest the carnage of Sumgait a quarter century ago serve as a foreshadowing of a greater slaughter” (Schiff 2013).

Perhaps the least helpful endorsements of Aylisli’s work came from Levon Melik-Shahnazarian, a native of Azerbaijan and political commentator known for his derogatory public rhetoric towards Azerbaijanis. Melik-Shahnazarian saw the value of the work not in Aylisli’s pro-peace message, which he believes has no chance of taking root in contemporary Azerbaijani society, but in exposing the lies in Azerbaijan’s official rhetoric (Melik-Shahnazarian 2013).

One of the few negative reactions, and probably also the strangest, came from Gevorg Danielyan, formerly Armenia’s Minister of Justice (2007-10) who said that he “cannot understand the excitement caused by Aylisli…Those who have read the book did not understand its true meaning. This is another trick of Azerbaijan’s diplomacy. I do not believe that the writer is really subjected to harassment because traitors are usually axed in Azerbaijan” (A1+ 2013).

Among the genuinely sympathetic responses, Hrant Matevosyan’s son David Matevosyan, also a writer, reacted to the anti-Aylisli campaign early on, demanding that “imperialists” from both Russia and the U.S. intervene to guarantee the safety of his “friend, brother and human being” beyond any ethnic group.2 Matevosyan went on to lambast propagandists and politicians in both countries who stink of “khanates and Stalinism simultaneously” (epress.am 2013b). Incidentally, on 13 February the U.S. State Department did react, expressing concern over Aylisli’s safety and noting that the ear-cutting threat had been rescinded (U.S. Department of State 2013).

Another Armenian writer, Levon Javakhian, called Aylisli a brave writer who needed to be defended and urged the Armenian public discourse on Aylisli not to further endanger him at home. In 2008 Javakhian faced criticism for his work “Kirve” (roughly translated as “Godfather”) that included the sympathetic portrayal of Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia.

Javakhian observed that many Armenian intellectuals, while praising Aylisli, still could not rid themselves of anti-Azerbaijani biases. “For me, there is an Azerbaijan of Ramil Safarov and an Azerbaijan of Akram Aylisli. Aylisli’s novel elevated Azerbaijan, and didn’t let it be stereotyped as a criminal with an axe,” he said. According to Javakhian, Ragip Zarakoglu, a prominent Turkish human rights activist and publisher, proposed to print Javakhian’s and Aylisli’s works together (Radio Azadlig 2013b).

In an online Q & A, the most prominent Baku Armenian and perhaps the most prominent of all Baku natives, former chess champion Garry Kasparov referred to intolerant attitudes in Baku, but avoided commenting about Aylisli directly, perhaps mindful that his comments may not be helpful (Argumenty i fakty 2013). His website nevertheless reprinted an appeal by a prominent Russian writer Boris Akunin in defence of Aylisli (Kasparov.ru 2013).

Finally, the most touching reaction came from Lusik Aguletsi, a Yerevan artist who recognized herself in Aylisli’s portrayal of a young Armenian girl who would spend hours painting a church, while visiting her grandmother in Aylis/Agulis. Aguletsi, then 14, recalled meeting Aylisli, then 25, only once. “He talked to my grandmother in a very cultured and tender way, as if he was her son, and when I asked who it was, she said he was “the best educated youth from our village” (Public Dialogues, 2013).

By publishing the novel in Russian rather than its original Azerbaijani, Aylisli made clear that his intended audience also included those outside of Azerbaijan, particularly Armenians and in his interview with Burtin, Aylisli was positive about the novel’s impact: “After that little story Armenians grew kinder towards us. Of course, among them there are some provocateurs who would prefer that I had been killed and for Azerbaijanis to be painted as wild and uncivilized.

Nevertheless, Armenian intellectuals and lots of common people have become a little softer, freed themselves of anger, took a breath of air…” (Burtin 2013). Indeed, with his brave novel Aylisli has provided those Armenians, who continue to hope and argue for long-term peace with Azerbaijan, with an important point of contrast and inspiration.

Notes
1 For further information see www.djulfa.com and https://www.facebook.com/silencedstones/info
2 For more information on Hrant Matevosyan see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrant_Matevosyan

References
A1+, 2013. “Opinion: Traitors are usually axed in Azerbaijan”. 27 February; available at http://en.a1plus.am/37500.html
Argumenty i fakty, 2013. “The great chess player at 50: online with Garry Kasparov”. 21
February; available at www.aif.ru/onlineconf/5966/3
Armenpress, 2013. “Civilizational abyss between Azerbaijan and the international community is
deepening. Edward Nalbandian” 27 February; available at http://armenpress.am/
eng/news/709840
Burtin, Shura, 2013. “The pen and the axe: Why should becoming a nation’s conscience make
you its enemy?” Russkiy Reporter, 12 November; available at http://rusrep.ru/article/
2013/11/10/aylisli/ epress.am, 2013a. “Azerbaijani writer to be translated into Armenian: publisher hasn’t read the
novel.” 13 February; available at www.epress.am/ru/2013/02/13/Азербайджанского-писателя-переводят.html
_____. 2013b. “I am shaking the hand of Akram Aylisli”. 9 February; available at
www.epress.am/ru/2013/02/08/«Жму-руку-Акраму-Айлисли»-Армянский-п.html
Kasparov.ru, 2013. “Pro Azerbaydzhan”. 8 February; available at www.kasparov.ru/
material.php?id=511400C916A98
Melik-Shahnazarian, Levon, 2013. “Why is the Azerbaijani government attacking Akram
Aylisli?. Voskanapat, 1 February.
Public Dialogues, 2013. “Akram Aylisli and Lusik Aguletsi”. 4 April; available at
www.publicdialogues.info/node/523
Radio Azadlig, 2013a. “Akram Aylisli about the Armenian translation of his novel.” 15 April;
available at www.radioazadlyg.org/content/article/24957919.html
_____. 2013b. “An Armenian writer on Aylisli”. 27 February; available at
www.radioazadlyg.org/content/article/24914564.html
Schiff, Adam, B., 2013. “Honouring the victims of Sumgait”. Extensions of remarks, 28
February. Congressional Record, 113th Congress (2013-2014); available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?r113%3AE28FE3-0001%3A
U.S. Department of State, 2013. Daily Press Briefing, 13 February. Available at
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/02/204564.htm

January 11, 2021	President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan meet with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and agree to reopen transportation links. At the same time, Aliyev refuses to return an estimate 100 Armenian military personnel and civilians captured during fighting.
November 10, 2020	After Azerbaijani forces capture southern districts of Karabakh, including Hadrut and Shushi, Armenia agrees to end the fighting and withdraw from Agdam, Kelbajar and Lachin. Russian peacekeeping forces enter Karabakh.
September 27, 2020	Azerbaijan initiates a full-scale offensive along the entire line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Karabakh. After days of fighting, Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces make advances in Karabakh’s northeast and south.
July-August, 2020	Turkey pledges full support to Azerbaijan’s efforts to restore its territorial integrity. Joint military exercises take place in Azerbaijan for which Turkey transports F-16 fighter jets and other military equipment to Azerbaijan.
July 12-16, 2020	Fighting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border leaves 18 dead on both sides, including senior Azerbaijani officers. The fighting triggers pro-war protests in Azerbaijan.
February 15, 2020	Aliyev and Pashinyan meet in Munich and after the meeting hold a joint conference, which turns into a debate.
August 5, 2019	During a rally in Stepanakert, Pashinyan declares, “Artsakh is Armenia. Period.”
April-May 2018	After mass protests in Armenia, Sargsyan resigns, Nikol Pashinyan is elected as Armenia’s leader
February-October 2017	Sporadic clashes continue in Karabakh, until Sargsyan and Aliyev meet in Geneva and agree to reduce tensions
April 2-5, 2016	Azerbaijan initiates the largest offensive since the conclusion of active fighting in 1994. Azerbaijan forces capture several posts in the north and in the south of Karabakh, after an Armenian counterattack in the north, several positions are restored. In 4 days of fighting, heavy artillery and drones are involved, with some 200 people killed on both sides.
March 31-April 1, 2016	US Secretary of State John Kerry holds separate meetings with Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Washington. Hours later Azerbaijan begins an offensive in Karabakh.
2012-2016	Low-intensity fighting takes place in Karabakh and on Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with Azerbaijani forces conducting hit-and-run attacks, and Armenian forces retaliating.
June 2011	During talks in Kazan, Russia Aliyev walks away from an agreement with Sargsyan on basic principles of resolution.
November 2, 2008	The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev, meet in Moscow and pledge to find a political solution to the Karabakh conflict, but no progress is made in talks.
November 29, 2007	After a meeting in Madrid the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs announce that a set of Basic Principles for the peaceful settlement of the conflict is proposed. The principles link Armenian withdrawals from the east and south of Karabakh to security guarantees and determination of Karabakh’s status via referendum.
February 19, 2004	During NATO training in Budapest, Azerbaijani officer Ramil Safarov murders Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe in his sleep, triggering international condemnation and deepening of mistrust between Armenian and Azerbaijani societies.
August-December, 2003	Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev dies, succeeded by his son Ilham Aliyev.
April 2001	Armenia’s Robert Kocharyan and Azerbaijan’s Heydar Aliyev come close to an agreement that would make NKAO and Lachin corridor part of Armenia, with other territories transferred to Azerbaijan; Aliyev backs away from the agreement.
February 3, 1998	Armenia’s first president Levon Ter-Petrossian resigns after his plan for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict is rejected. Former Karabakh leader Robert Kocharyan is elected president of Armenia.
January 1, 1997	The OSCE Minsk Groups establishes the trilateral co-chairmanship format of the United States, France, and Russia, still in effect until today.
December 2, 1996	During the OSCE summit in Lisbon, Azerbaijan stresses the importance of territorial integrity; Armenia vetoes the final document.
March 23, 1995	OSCE established the co-chairmanship of the Conference on Nagorno Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group.
May 12, 1994	Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh agree on a cease-fire brokered by Russia, ending three years of fighting.
April-May, 1994	Armenian forces advance in Agdam and Mardakert districts.
December 1993-February 1994	Azerbaijani forces on the offensive in Karabakh, but their efforts to make advances are repulsed by Armenian forces.
November 12, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 884 condemns the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Horadiz, attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic; calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic.
October 14, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 874 expresses concern that a continuation of the conflict in and around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic, would endanger peace and security in the region and supports the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE.
August 23-31, 1993	Armenian forces establish control over Jebrayil, Kubatli districts and part of Fizuli, to the south of NKAO’s administrative border.
July 29, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 853 expresses concern over the seizure of the district of Agdam in the Azerbaijani Republic (not specified by whom), Urges the Government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region to comply with the resolutions.
April 30, 1993	UN Security Council Resolution 822 expresses serious concern at the deterioration of the relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, in particular, the latest invasion of the Kelbajar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces.
November 1992-February, 1993	Armenian forces retake the initiative in the war, expanding the Lachin corridor, creating a security buffer around Kapan and recapturing much of the Mardakert district
June-October, 1992	Azerbaijani forces on the offensive against Karabakh, with almost half of the Armenian territory, including Shaumyan and Mardakert districts, captured, and local population displaced.
May 18, 1992	Armenian forces take control of Lachin, establishing a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.
May 9, 1992	Armenians take Shushi, effectively ending the siege and bombardment of Stepanakert from the GRAD launchers located in Shushi.
April 10, 1992	Azerbaijani forces enter the village of Maragha, murdering some forty civilians.
May 18, 1992	Armenian forces take control of Lachin, establishing a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.
May 9, 1992	Armenians take Shushi, lifting the siege of Stepanakert.
April 10, 1992	Azerbaijani forces enter the village of Maragha, in NKAO’s northeast, murdering some forty civilians.
February 26, 1992	Armenian self-defense forces capture the Khojaly settlement, where Karabakh’s only airport is located; hundreds of civilians die as they flee from Khojaly towards Agdam
September 25, 1991	The siege of Stepanakert begins with shelling launched from Shushi and nearby villages. Armenian self-defense forces are surrounded in NKAO, resupplied from Armenia by helicopters.
September 21, 1991	Armenia declares independence after the positive results of the nationwide referendum.
September 2, 1991	Nagorno Karabakh declares itself a republic, citing Soviet law on secession and international principle of self-determination
August 30, 1991	Azerbaijan declares itself independent of the Soviet Union and a successor state of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (1918-20)
January 1990-August, 1991	Supported by Soviet internal troops, Azerbaijani security forces conduct operations intended to expel the Armenian population from the vicinity and inside NKAO. Armenian self-defense is organized.
January 13-19, 1990	Pogroms of the Armenian population in Baku lead to dozens killed, and remaining Armenians leaving Azerbaijan.
December 1, 1989	Legislatures of Soviet Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast make declarations of unification.
Fall 1988	Massive exodus of the Armenian population from Armenia and Azerbaijani population from Armenia; dozens killed in ethnic-motivated clashes.
July 18, 1988	The Supreme Council of the USSR rejects Armenian demands of unification.
June 17, 1988	Soviet Azerbaijan expresses opposition to calls of transferring Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to Soviet Armenia.
June 15, 1988	Soviet Armenian legislature votes in favor of unifying with Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.
June 12, 1988	Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast regional legislature votes in favor of unification with Soviet Armenia.
March 25, 1988	Soviet leader Gorbachev rejects Armenian calls of unification.
February 27-29, 1988	Pogroms in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait lead to the deaths of dozens of Armenians at the hands of Azerbaijani mob and the exodus of the large Armenian community of Azerbaijan.
February 22, 1988	Azerbaijanis march from the town of Aghdam towards Karabakh, where they meet an Armenian counter-protest, first deadly clashes ensue in the town of Askeran.
February 20, 1988	After public protests and grassroots lobbying, NKAO legislature adopts an appeal to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moscow to consider reassigning the oblast to Soviet Armenia.
July 7, 1923	Soviet Azerbaijan establishes borders of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (region), making it an enclave surrounded by Azerbaijani territory. Throughout the Soviet period Armenians raised the issue of reassigning Karabakh to Armenia, but Moscow rebuffed these efforts citing opposition from Azerbaijan.
July 5, 1921	After first Azerbaijan and then Armenia were both occupied by the Red Army, the dispute over Karabakh persisted. The Caucasus Bureau of the Russian Bolsheviks decided to establish a Karabakh autonomy inside Soviet Azerbaijan.
May 28, 1918	Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent following the Russian Revolution, and almost immediately went to war over several disputed territories, including Karabakh. By the fall of 1918, Turkish forces occupied much of the Caucasus, including Karabakh’s capital of Shusha. Turkish-Azerbaijani forces tried to control Karabakh but met Armenian resistance.

1.	At about 7AM on Sunday morning, Turkish and Azerbaijani forces launched an unprecedented attack on the Armenian-administered Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh), with hundreds of missiles and drones launched, followed by ground attacks. Turkish forces included an F-16 squadron that specializes in air defense suppression, the Bayraktar drone fleet that targets ground forces, and more than 2,000 mercenary forces, most of them from Syria, used to launch ground attacks.
2.	The attack came after open threats of military action against Armenia made by Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his defense minister Hulusi Akar. According to reporting by the Russian Kommersant newspaper, Akar along with other senior Turkish military officers were in Azerbaijan and directly in charge of the offensive.
3.	As the attack unfolded, Turkish leaders said that their goal was to completely oust Armenian forces from Artsakh and Turkish military and associated social media began publishing videos from Turkish Bayraktar drones showing attacks against Armenian forces, as well as claims of tactical advances.
4.	In early October, Azerbaijan’s artillery and air attacks increasingly became indiscriminate, focusing the shelling on population centers such as Stepanakert, rather than military targets. The Armenian side responded with attacks against Azerbaijani towns such as Ganja, Mingechaur and Barda.
5.	In fighting on the ground, Turkish-backed Azerbaijani forces succeeded in capturing the two Armenian-populated villages of Talish and Madagis in Artsakh’s northeast, and advanced in the south of Karabakh, along the border with Iran and through Hadrut towards Shushi. As fighting continued Azerbaijan was resupplied with ammunition from Israel, Ukraine and Belarus, and mercenaries from Turkey.
6.	In the more than 40 days of fighting, Russia, France and the United States – the three co-chairs in the international mediation effort on Karabakh – have failed to put an end to fighting or even to limit weapons and mercenary transfers that are fueling the war or introduce any other sanctions.
7.	By the time the cease-fire was agreed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on November 10, 2020, more than 3,500 Armenians, more than 3,000 Azerbaijanis and more than 500 Syrian mercenaries were confirmed killed. More than 100,000 people were displaced.
8.	In line with the cease-fire terms, Armenian forces withdrew from Aghdam, Kelbajar and Lachin district, while Russian forces deployed along the perimeter of the part of Karabakh that remained under Armenian control and along a 5km Lachin corridor connection to the Republic of Armenia. In all some three-fourth of pre-war Armenian-controlled territory is now controlled by Turkish-backed Azerbaijan.
9.	In violation of the cease-fire terms, in November-December 2020 Azerbaijani forces continued to advance in parts of Karabakh, capturing two more Armenian settlements and more than 70 Armenian military personnel and civilians, most of whom, along with others captured before the cease-fire, remain in Azerbaijan custody.
10.	The Russian peacekeeping mission in Karabakh is agreed for five years, with no determination of Karabakh’s status or security guarantees. Still more than 50,000 Karabakh Armenians displaced during the fighting have returned to Karabakh, primarily Stepanakert, since the cease-fire.

1.	Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) is a place of great natural beauty and peopled by indigenous Armenians best known for their humility and subtle sense of humor. Among people with roots in Artsakh are the world chess champion Garry Kasparov, Soviet composer Mikael Tariverdiyev and military figure Hovanes Bagramyan.
2.	The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno Karabakh is more than 100 years old and it pre-dates the establishment of independent national republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1918.
3.	Creation of the Armenian autonomy of Karabakh within Soviet Azerbaijan (1921-91) both helped freeze and preserve the conflict over the territory that reignited with the Soviet Union’s unraveling.
4.	The war over Karabakh of 1991-94, began as an ethnic cleansing campaign against Karabakh Armenians and as Armenians resisted, hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes on both sides of the conflict. Since 1990, there are no more Armenian communities on Azerbaijani-controlled side of the conflict and no Azerbaijani communities on the Armenian side.
5.	Azerbaijan – ruled by the Aliyev family for almost half a century – demands complete control over Nagorno Karabakh, which amounts to a call for its total ethnic cleansing. For decades, Azerbaijan has prohibited entry to ethnic Armenians (or people with Armenian-sounding names), independent of their citizenship. Azerbaijan has also charged its citizens who visited Armenia with treason. Any peace-building efforts were discouraged.
6.	The Second Karabakh war in the Fall of 2020 was jointly launched by Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Aliyev. Turkish air force and mercenary forces from Syria helped displace more than 30,000 Armenians, Artsakh’s civilians and infrastructure were attacked, with dozens of civilians killed, hundreds injured and tens of thousands displaced.
7.	In just 44 days of active combat, more than 3,500 Armenians, more than 3,000 Azerbaijanis and more than 500 Turkish Syrian mercenaries were killed.
8.	There are documented reports of war crimes being committed by Azerbaijani forces and Turkish mercenaries, including execution of prisoners, both civilian and military, beheadings and other degrading treatment.
9.	As a result of the November 10 cease-fire agreed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, Russian forces have been introduced and now protect the Armenian-populated parts of Karabakh and a narrow corridor from Karabakh to Armenia. A joint Russian-Turkish “monitoring center” is expected to be set up in an area adjacent to the Russian-controlled area.
10.	The agreement in force has not meant an end to the conflict. In particular, in violation of the agreement Azerbaijani forces continued to move their positions forward to capture more territory as well as prisoners of war and civilian hostages. Currently about 100 Armenians captured in Karabakh, most since after the cease-fire, are detained in Azerbaijan. Aliyev has refused to release them.

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